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What is an Expression?* 
Göran Sundholm
“I always have a quotation for everything — 
it saves original thinking.”
Lord Peter Wimsey, in: Dorothy L. Sayers,
Have His Carcase, Chapter IV.
1. Consider the following explanation:
(1)  is a proposition, namely the proposition that is true under no cir-
cumstances;
(2) (AB) is a proposition, when A and B are, namely the proposition that
is true on the condition that B is true, provided that A is true.
With this explanation I have accomplished an achievement comparable to
that attempted by Frege in the Grundgesetze and defined a (formal) language L,
the propositions of which can serve as contents of assertions and accordingly
can be used for communication.1
For contrast, consider also the following inductive definition, where the
asterisk indicates the concatenation operation in the freely generated algebra
of strings:
(i)  is a WFF;
(ii) If A and B are WFF’s, then so is (AB).
(iii) The only WFF’s are those obtained by (i) and (ii).2
With this definition I have accomplished an achievement comparable to
that of Hilbert, and defined a metamathematical object-language OL, con-
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* Text of an invited lecture at LOGICA 2001. The material was also presented in a seminar at
Turku University, November 2001. I draw on the work of Per Martin-Löf, from whom I have
learned about expressions in his Leyden lecture series 1993, and at talks in workshops at Tübingen
1998 and Leyden 2001, as well as in many conversations. Arianna Betti offered WORD-processing
help. To the organisers I owe the need to be brief; it is not the least virtue of LOGICA meetings
that presentations are short. I also thank the Editors for their patience and forbearance.
1 Comparable in that also my language is interpreted, but not as regards the scope of the endeav-
our. Frege wanted to give a formal language that was adequate for the practice of mathematical
analysis. As is well-known, his attempt failed owing to the emergence of the Zermelo-Russell para-
dox. My present effort, on the other hand, is demonstrably successful, but of a very limited range.
2 NB. The brackets and the horseshoe are here boldface.
cerning which metamathematical theorems can be proved.3 The explanation of
the language L has no extremal clause and it is in principle open-ended, just
like the formal languages of Frege, Lesniewski and Martin-Löf; nothing rules
out there being other propositions than those provided by the explanations (1)
and (2). In the case of OL, on the other hand, the extremal clause (iii) serves
to confine its WFF ‘s to those provided by (i) and (ii).
2. In spite of their superficial formal similarity, there is a considerable differ-
ence between the two examples. The expressions in the language L can be used
for stating truths. The WFF’s of OL are not suitable tools for speaking or writ-
ing; they do not lend themselves for communication. Thus,
(((())(()))) is true
is a meaningful declarative sentence that can be used for effecting acts of asser-
tion. The WFF
(((())(()))),
on the other hand, is only an object to be talked about and does not lend itself
for carrying out assertions or other communicative acts. This important cir-
cumstance is often ignored owing to the written nature of both items. 
WFF’s are objects, (meta)mathematical objects, and, as such, only meant to
be spoken about. Metamathematical object-languages so called are not proper-
ly languages; they do not comprise expressions that can be used for communi-
cation. In early authoritative expositions of Gödel’s theory object languages are
never exhibited.4 Since object-language “expressions” are never – indeed cannot
be – employed to say anything, but are only spoken about, the object-language
is de facto abolished.5 Instead, using clauses such as
A VARIABLE is a number of the form 29+4k, k= 0,1,2, …. 
one proceeds directly to the Gödel numbering, bypassing the object-language
entirely. The object-”language” “expressions” are treated solely as objects.
Donald Monk’s excellent textbook is a telling example from within the meta-
mathematical school of Tarski. A first-order language is nothing but a mathe-
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3 Even more comparable to the syntactic achievements of Gödel [1931], Tarski [1933], [1935],
Hans Hermes [1938], Karl Schröter [1941] (“semiotische Quadrupel”).
4 For instance, those of Mostowski [1952, p. 27] and Feferman [1960].
5 In Wittgenstein’s Tractarian (3.328) words: “If a sign is without use, it has no meaning. This is
the point of Ockham’s maxim”.
matical object, namely a certain quintuple construed set-theoretically.6 A nat-
ural, and possibly inevitable, culmination of this tendency can be found in Yuri
Manin’s unorthodox but very stimulating Course in Mathematical Logic, where
the expressive side of language is simply ignored:
Let A be any abstract set. We call A an alphabet. Finite strings of elements
of A are called expressions. Finite sequences of expressions are called texts.7
Accordingly any finite string (over any set) is taken as an expression; hence,
strictly and literally anything goes: meaning is now of no concern whatever in
a “text”.
3. Consider the following definition of a function  by means of metamathe-
matical recursion over the set WFF’s.
(i)  (0) =def   WFF;
(ii) (k+1) = def ((k) (k))  WFF.
Hence 
  WFF, and (k+1)  WFF, for every k  .
However,
when a  , then also 10a  .
Accordingly, since 23  ,
m = def (10
10
…1023
+ 1)  ,
where the exponentiation has been iterated 23 times, and so
(m)  WFF.
This WFF is a certain (meta)mathematical object. If we want to refer to it,
however, there is no other way available to us than to use some such device as
the -function. The definition of the set WFF runs completely parallel to the
recursive definition of the natural numbers:
0  
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6 Monk [1976, Definition 10.1, p. 162]. Indeed, Monk’s “languages” are the counterparts of
Schröter’s semiotische Quadrupel.
7 Manin [1977, p. 3].
and
a  
s(a)  
where the corresponding extremal clause is the principle of definition by recur-
sion/proof by induction, with respect to the natural numbers thus defined. In
Constructive Type Theory, a set is defined by laying down how its canonical
elements may be formed, and when two canonical elements are equal canoni-
cal elements of the set.8 Non-canonical elements are equal when they evaluate
to equal canonical elements. The canonical natural numbers are 0 and succes-
sors. The relevant specifications of equality are 
0 = 0  ,
that is, 0 is the same canonical element of N as 0, and
a = b  
s(a) = s(b)  
that is, when a and b are (not necessarily canonical) equal elements of N, their
successors are equal canonical elements of N. There is no way that we can give
the non-canonical element (m) of the set WFF in a fully canonical form, with-
out non-canonical parts. The string (m) over the alphabet { ,  , ( , ) } has a
length that is larger than (it is customary to claim on these occasions) the num-
ber of atoms in the known universe. On the other hand, ‘(m)’ is a real expres-
sion that stands for a metamathematical “expression”, namely the (non-canoni-
cal) element (m) of the set WFF. Metamathematical expressions do not express,
owing to their lack of content; they are objects that can be expressed, using real
expressions with meaning, for instance, as just mentioned, the expression ‘(m)’. 
If I want to use an expression (that eo ipso has meaning, owing to its
nature), I cannot get by with a simulacrum such as a name of the expression; I
need the expression itself and not its name. The name of a metamathematical
OL “expression”, on the other hand, is a real expression with content, but what
it names is an object without meaning, namely an element of a freely generated
algebra of strings.
Some might find it unnecessary or otherwise unprofitable to harp on this
difference; what does it matter?9 One then does well to recall that Tarski’s
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8 Martin-Löf [1984, pp. 8-10] 
9 I know personally quite a few philosophers who do; strangely enough, a surprising number of
them have names (first or otherwise) that begin with the letter D.
[1933] truth-predicate is a propositional function with the set of WFF ‘s as its
range of significance: 
T(x) is a proposition, provided x  WFF.10
But 
()  WFF,
and thus 
T(()) is a proposition. 
Furthermore, it is a true proposition, since
[T(())  	
] is true,
since 	
 is a true proposition, both constructively, with proof-object x.x,
that is, the identity function on the (empty) set of proofs of , and non-con-
structively in virtue of the truth-table for .
An attempt to apply the Tarskian T-predicate would, however, turn into a
fiasco. As already stressed, the range of significance for the propositional func-
tion T(x) consists of WFF’s rather than propositions; an attempt to insert the
proposition T(()) into the argument place held by the variable that
ranges over WFF’s would rift asunder the categorical structure of our language
and, concomitantly, also that of the world.
4. Thus far, I have only trodden the via negativa when attempting an answer to
the question of my title. An essentially correct – albeit trivial – positive answer
is readily forthcoming though: whatever an expression may be, it must express,
or have, content. The expression is an expression only in virtue of expressing
what it expresses. An expression without meaning — an expression that does
not express — is a contradiction in terms. With respect to real (“meaningful”)
expressions we accordingly have the following formulae:
What Is an Expression? 185
10 Strictly speaking this is not true, since Tarski does not employ a typed universe of individuals.
Accordingly, his T-predicate, like any other predicate, has the universe of everything as its range of
significance. Propositions, nevertheless, also for Tarski, are not things. Thus, the point I make
below holds good also for his formulation; that his object language – for the “general theory of
classes” – is considerably richer than mine is of no concern here.
expresses
‘c’ means c   
has the meaning   
that is,
c is expressed by ‘c’.
It is important to realise that the expression ‘c’ is obtained from the mean-
ing c. Without the meaning c being given in this way, there is no access to the
expression ‘c’. The expression is obtained from the meaning by disregarding
what is given, namely the meaning (object) c and instead focusing on how (in
what form) it is given, namely through the expression ‘c’. If we consider the
object (meaning) c and divest it of content what remains is the form ‘c’ through
which it is given:
formalization                     “contentualization”, 
sugaring      
Only in virtue of its meaning-bearing role do we have access to the expres-
sion: when nothing is expressed, there is no expression. Wittgenstein in the
Tractatus would say that the relation between the expression (“symbol”) and
what it expresses, or symbolises, is internal. For instance, somewhat later, con-
cerning propositions, that is a special kind of expression, we find:
Ogden & Richards and Russell consider that the relation of proposition to
fact is an external relation; this is not correct. It is an internal relation. An
internal relation cannot be otherwise; it is given in the terms involved, in
the nature of proposition and fact.11
The modern (“Quinean”) relation of reference
c refers to b, in symbols Ref(c, b),
on the other hand, is an external one that may, or may not, obtain.12 The
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11 Wittgenstein [1930-32, Lecture A IV, p. 9].
12 Some writers in the modern “semantic” tradition here prefer
Val(c) = b, 
using a “valuation” function Val instead of the reference relation Ref. Mutatis mutandis the points
made remain valid.
c

‘c’
objects c and b are independent of each other and can exist without standing
in the Ref relation. For Quine, reference is
an important relation of words to objects – or better – of words to other
objects, some of which are not words – or even better, of objects some of
which are words to objects some of which are not words.13
Without the object/meaning c, the expression, or “word”, ‘c’, that is, the
material embodiment of the meaning c, cannot exist, however; in the other
direction, as soon as the meaning c is given, or “expressed”, we have embodied
the meaning c in the expression ‘c’.
Frege, the Founding Father of modern logic, for one, was fully aware of
these issues and held the right views:
As Sinn causes difficulties at times, one quickly decides to throw it out
and then naturally retains the soulless signs. The progenitor of such a the-
ory does not want to express Thoughts with his signs, but only to play
according to certain rules. Thus, in no way truth is there at issue. … One
empties the signs of content, in order to avoid inconvenient questions;
nevertheless, one then also balks at acknowledging the signs as really
empty.14
From earlier formulations in Über Sinn und Bedeutung we know that Frege
uses bezeichnen (designate) and bedeuten (signify) for the relation between the
Zeichen (sign) and its Bedeutung.
Ein Eigenname (Wort, Zeichen, Zeichenverbindung, Ausdruck) drückt aus
seinen Sinn, bedeutet oder bezeichnet seine Bedeutung. Wir drücken mit
einem Zeichen dessen Sinn aus und bezeichnen mit ihm dessen Bedeu-
tung.15
In view of the ambiguity in Bedeutung, perhaps first noted by Ignacio An-
gelelli, signification (significance?) might well be the best translation into
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13 Nelson Goodman’s apt words in Quine [1973, p. xi].
14 Frege [1906, II, p. 396]:
Da der Sinn zuweilen Schwierigkeiten macht, treibt man ihn kurz entsclossen ganz aus und behält
dann natürlich die entseelten Zeichen zurück. Der Urheber einer solchen Theorie will mit seinen
Zeichen keine Gedanken ausdrücken, sondern nur nach gewissen Regeln spielen. Also kann es
dabei gar nicht um Wahrheit handeln. … Man entleert die Zeichen, um unbequemen Fragen zu ent-
gehen; aber die Zeichen dann auch wirklich als leer anzuerkennen, sträubt man sich. 
15 [1892, p. 34]
English, covering both of Angelelli’s readings: designated entity and logical sig-
nificance (weight, import{ance}).16 Frege’s formula then becomes:
a sign expresses its sense and designates, or signifies, its signification.17
The sense, furthermore, should, according to Frege, “contain a mode of given-
ness” for the signification:
Es liegt nun Nahe, mit einem Zeichen (Namen, Wortverbindung, Schrift-
zeichen) außer dem Bezeichneten, was die Bedeutung des Zeichen heißen
möge, noch das verbunden zu denken, was ich den Sinn des Zeichens nen-
nen möchte, worin die Art des Gegebenseins enthalten ist.18
In these formulations, the sign cannot be of the soulless kind, since then
nothing is expressed. It is the sign with content (Inhalt) that expresses a sense
(Sinn) containing (enthalten) a mode of givenness of, or for, the designated
entity.
Ferdinand de Saussure must have developed his theory of the sign during
the first decade of the twentieth century. His signe comprises two parts, the
material signifiant and the conceptual signifié:
I call the combination of a concept and a sound-image a sign, but in current
usage the term generally designates only a sound-image, a word, for exam-
ple (arbor, etc.). One tends to forget that arbor is called a sign only because
it carries the concept “tree”, with the result that the idea of the sensory part
implies the idea of the whole.
…
Ambiguity would disappear if the three notions involved here were desig-
nated by three names, each suggesting and opposing the others. I propose
to retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace concept
and sound-image respectively by signified[signifié] and signifier[signifiant];
the last two items have the advantage of indicating the opposition that sep-
arates them from each other and from the whole of which they are parts.
As regards sign, if I am satisfied with it, this is simply because I do not know
of any word to replace it, the ordinary language suggesting no other.19
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16 Angelleli [1982] and earlier writings cited there.
17 [1892, p. 31].
18 [1892, p. 26].
19 De Saussure [1916, p. 67]. 
Both Frege:
Sinn
Zeichen Ding (Bedeutung)
and De Saussure: 
Concept
Acoustic image Thing
get semiotic triangles that are strongly reminiscent of the Scholastic tag vox
significat mediantibus conceptibus, with the corresponding semiotic triangle:
conceptus
vox res
The similarity is obvious. The diagrams are isomorphic: Frege’s soulless
sign corresponds to De Saussure’s acoustic image, which is the Scholastic vox,
and the (mediating) concept employed by De Saussure (and the Scholastics)
corresponds to Frege’s Sinn.20
For De Saussure, the sign is comprised out of two interlocking parts, name-
ly the acoustic image and the concept. Accordingly, if we allow ourselves to be
guided by the above correspondence, the Fregean sign would comprise the
soulless sign and its sense. How, precisely, the sign expresses its sense, which,
in its turn, contains a route to the designated entity, I do not see clearly. On the
other hand, Frege’s brief elucidation, in the by now classical essays from the
1890’s, might not suffice for determining the precise relationship between the
soulless sign, the sign, its sense, and designated entity, nor, indeed, were they
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20 The anti-psychologist Frege [1892, p. 29] would, however, reject De Saussure’s mentalistic
notion of a concept; his sense is a Platonist “third realm” denizen.
necessarily intended by Frege to do so.21 Such underdetermination would not
be surprising, given the modest stated task of those remarks, namely that of
buttressing the early sections of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. On his own
perception, Frege was offering aid towards understanding the technical work.
Nothing indicates that he considered himself to have (created) a thoroughly
worked out philosophy of language, including a complete semiotic.
Concerning the connection between sign and sense, Wittgenstein, in the
Tractaus, is reasonably explicit, and certainly more so than Frege. A very late
change, and possibly the last substantial one, in the step from the Prototractatus
to the Tractatus, introduces the distinction between sign and symbol.22 A sym-
bol comprises a material part, the sign, in which the symbol is sinnlich
wahrnehmbar (3.32). This part is accidental (3.34). Initially, any other choice
would have done, but once the choice is made one has to live with it. Another
aspect of the symbol is essential, namely what is common to all symbols that
can serve the same purpose (3.341). For instance, the English colour-word red
can serve the same purpose as the German rot. For Wittgenstein, “(P&Q)” and
“(PQ)” are the same symbol, because they serve the same purpose, name-
ly that of effecting a certain (directed) partition in logical space, in virtue of
having the same truth-table. That truth-table, incidentally, is yet a third way,
according to Wittgenstein, of giving the same symbol. In all three cases, the
(perceptible) sign component of the symbol differs from those of the other
two, but the symbol, nonetheless, is the same.
Accordingly the Tractarian semiotic triangle is a more complex one: 
Symbol:
das Projizierte 
In order to spell out the connections between the sign (Zeichen), symbol
and what is essential in the symbol (das Wesentliche am Symbol), that is, the
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21 The footnotes [1893, pp. 5, 7, and 9] as well as the Vorwort to [1891] are relevant here.
22 Kremer [1997, pp. 101-107] is very helpful on these matters; in particular, he notes the connec-
tion to Sellars, more about which in the sequel.
das Wesentliche 
am Symbol
 
Zeichen
linguistic role fulfilled by the sign, we may profitably employ notions and nota-
tions introduced by Wilfrid Sellars.23 Ordinary quotes are used for symbols;
thus, ‘red’ is an English expression with meaning, that is, a symbol. Asterisk
quotes are used for material aspects of symbols, e.g. *red* is a sign. Finally, dot
quotes are used to indicate linguistic roles. Accordingly, the linguistic role
•red• is played in Swedish by some *röd*’s. For all three notions a type/token
distinction applies: for instance, the token
red
is a *red*, and so is also the token
red.
Employing Sellars’ notation to a more or less concrete example, our dia-
gram takes the form:
‘house’:
An entirely parallel semiotic pattern is obtained also in De Saussure’s
Cours de  linguistique générale: according to the correspondence:
DE SAUSSURE: signe — signifiant — signifié;
WITTGENSTEIN: Symbol — Zeichen — das Wesentliche am Symbol.
We may also attempt to capture this semiotic structure in a
NEUTRAL TERMINOLOGY: sign — form — content.
Our semiotic structure can be applied also to non-linguistic matters. The
game of chess serves well to illustrate this, as De Saussure probably was the
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23 See Sellars [1950], [1963] and above all [1974, §§ IV-VI].
•house•   
 
*house*
first to stress.24 This chess example is by now very well-known, owing to its
being used in Wittgenstein’s Philosophische Untersuchungen (§ 108). The white
King — the chess piece, that is — in one sense is a strangely shaped piece of var-
nished wood. This piece of wood, which corresponds to De Saussure’s acoustic
image and to Wittgenstein’s accidental aspect of the symbol, may of course
serve in many roles, and can be used for many purposes, among which those
given by:
(1) “Blunt instrument to be entered into evidence as Exhibit B, m’lud.”
(2) (unsuccessful) specimen of peasant religious art;
(3) barbecue ignition-fuel;
(4) a toy church-tower from a children’s’ box of bricks;
(5) agglomeration of vanished carbon compounds (a chemical specimen);
(6) totem in a phallic religion; 
(7) the Chess King.25
Why content has been largely lost in modern philosophy of language, why
signs are held to be merely (the analogues of) dead wood, I cannot fathom. The
conflation between real expressions (with content, and used for speaking) and
metamathematical “expressions” (without content, only to be spoken about)
that is often found in logic since the metamathematical turn around 1930 is, of
course, a possible reason for, as well as a symptom of, the lack of content.
Another is Quine’s preference for objects in conjunction with his hostility to
meaning that has led him to view expressions, say, the bearers of reference, sole-
ly as objects. His preferred relata in the reference relation are material objects.
Again, content is lost, but for Quine, this is neither unexpected nor unwelcome. 
I have been concerned to spell out a difference between words (“expres-
sions”) and objects: words just are not just objects. Respecting this difference has
far-reaching consequences for how semantics should be done. For instance, it is
not at all clear that current theories of reference that are patterned on the evalu-
ation-functions for terms in Tarskian metamathematical theories of truth are able
to serve as Fregean theories of reference. And how do the various approaches to
definite descriptions fare when one takes the difference between word and object
seriously? An elaboration of a certain Proper Names Theory for Definite Descrip-
tions (!!) that flows naturally on my approach will however have to wait for anoth-
er occasion, so as not to tax the Editorial patience beyond endurance.
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24 The references to chess are listed in the index in the English (1967) translation; Part II, Chapter
3 is particularly relevant here. Harris [1988, pp. 24-26] notes the parallel between De Saussure and
Wittgenstein.
25 According to some, among whom Chess World Championship Candidate (joint winner of the
AVRO Tournament 1938) and psychoanalyst Reuben Fine [1967, pp. 8-12], the last two items (6)
and (7) coincide.
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